

THE DEFENDER



Volume 10, Issue 1

An informative newsletter of the State of West Virginia Public Defender Services

January 2009

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The Defender is a publication
of West Virginia Public Defender
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Inquiries, articles and suggestions
are always welcome.

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FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR'S CHAIR

by Jack Rogers

The last year has been like living in Alice's Wonderland: it takes all the running you can do to stay in the same place.

In mid-February, 2008 we got one more employee to process vouchers (total of five); then our most experienced processor, went on medical leave for nearly three months. Net result: we had the usual four processors, only one was less experienced. Although she did an exemplary job, there was little net gain from the additional position in FY 2008.

Beginning July 1, 2008, we were allowed a sixth position to process vouchers. However, we were scheduled to move and because of lack of space and equipment I had to delay hiring until the move was accomplished. The move was of course delayed for numerous reasons and we did not occupy our new space until September 26, 2008.

By mid-October, we had chosen a new employee who started soon thereafter. On Monday, January 5, 2009 she quit for a job paying twice what we can pay.

We have set all-time records for numbers of vouchers processed (over 30,000 in FY 2008, continuing at that pace despite disruptions). However, the number of vouchers received since July 1, 2008 has been at the 40,000 per year rate.

The result is that we are now processing vouchers received in late June 2008. This enormous influx will reduce soon since the time period has now elapsed for sending in vouchers that involve work ending June 30, 2008 or before. Also, three temporary employees will be used beginning January 12, 2009 but gains in productivity will most likely be slow. We ask for your understanding.

Also, I suggest that you support whatever supplemental increase the Governor may allow. I expect he will do everything in his power to see that proper funding is given but the ultimate decision rests with the Legislature.

Currently, we estimate that absent supplemental funding we will be out of funds by late March, 2009 except for a very small amount resulting from whatever budget savings Public Defenders can achieve.

Finally, look for the report from the Indigent Defense Commission on our web site, www.wvpds.org. On 15 January 2009 the Commission will report to the Legislature on Public Defender offices as required by W. Va. Code §29-21-3b. The report will be posted soon thereafter.

WV SUPREME COURT UPDATE

Fall 2008 Term Updates

All cases may be viewed online at: [http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/docs/fall08/\(case#\).htm](http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/docs/fall08/(case#).htm)

Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Blevins, No. 33281 – September 26, 2008 – Per Curiam

ATTORNEYS – DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

The respondent attorney was the subject of a statement of charges filed by the Investigative Panel of the Lawyer Disciplinary Board. The statement alleged that the respondent had asked Curtis Griffin, a convicted felon, to attempt to obtain a handgun for the respondent. The statement also detailed meetings between the respondent, Griffin and William Curtin, an associate of the respondent.

The purpose of these meetings (which were electronically recorded by Griffin, who was working as an undercover informant for the Ohio Valley Drug Task Force) concerned attempts by the respondent to collect debts from clients and other persons. The statement alleged that the respondent told Griffin and Curtin to collect the monies from the named persons and that he would split the proceeds of the collections with them. The respondent advised Griffin and Curtin to tell these persons not to report the collections, and to let them know that they were “done” or would have a “little problem” if they reported the collections.

The Hearing Panel Subcommittee of the Lawyer Disciplinary Board determined that the respondent’s conduct constituted violations of Rule 8.4(a), (b) and (d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Panel recommended suspension of the respondent’s law license for eighteen months, supervision of practice upon reinstatement, additional continuing education in ethics upon his reinstatement, and payment of costs.

The Court determined that the Hearing Panel’s findings were supported by credible evidence. The Court declined to adopt the respondent’s contention that his discussions with Griffin regarding collection of debt were simply “role playing”, and noted the elaborate nature of the plan and the potentially “tragic consequences” of the scheme.

The Court adopted the majority of the recommended sanctions, but due to the severity of the violations annulled the respondent’s law license. The Court also ordered that prior to his reinstatement, the respondent be certified by a psychiatrist that the respondent’s return to practice would not be a danger to the public.

Law License Annulled.

State v. Megan S., No. 33831 – November 7, 2008 – Per Curiam (*Wood County – Beane, J.*)

JUVENILES – SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Juvenile appellant appealed the circuit court’s adjudication for the offense of battery. On appeal, the appellant asserted (1) that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she had committed the offense, and (2) that she was denied effective assistance of counsel at her adjudicatory hearing.

The allegations arose out of an altercation between the appellant and a female juvenile. It was undisputed that an altercation occurred, but the appellant disputed being the aggressor and testified that the altercation was a mutual combat occasioned by an argument between the parties. The victim testified that she engaged in an argument with the appellant, who struck her in the face and then continued striking her after breaking off the initial fight.

Held: The Court held that while there was conflicting evidence about the fight, that when viewed in the light most favorable to the State there was sufficient evidence to sustain the appellant's adjudication of delinquency. The Court noted the appellant's testimony that she had struck the victim first and had returned to confront her after the initial fight had ended.

The Court declined to review the appellant's assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel, which included trial counsel's purported failure to subpoena witnesses to the fight and to assert self defense. The Court noted that the record was insufficient to determine the validity of the appellant's assertions. (In a footnote, the Court noted that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are typically developed in *habeas corpus* proceedings. Noting that the appellant was not incarcerated and had been placed on probation, the Court declined to address the issue of whether a probationer can assert such claims in *habeas corpus* proceedings.)

Affirmed.

Lowe v. Cicchirillo, Comm'r., No. 33731 – November 7, 2008 – Per Curiam (*Harrison County – Marks, J.*)

DUI – ADMINISTRATIVE REVOCATION OF DRIVER'S LICENSE

Appellee Lowe was injured in an automobile accident on December 10, 2005. Following an investigation, he was charged with driving under the influence and subsequently received a notice of revocation from the DMV. Following an administrative hearing upholding the revocation, Lowe appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court reversed the order of revocation, finding that (1) the DMV erroneously admitted evidence obtained by a search warrant of Lowe's blood alcohol content; (2) the DMV erroneously determined that Lowe was driving improperly at the time of the accident; and (3) the DMV had failed to give sufficient consideration to Lowe's acquittal of the criminal DUI charge. The DMV appealed these findings.

Held: The Court reversed the circuit court and remanded for an order reinstating Lowe's license revocation.

The Court held (1) that it was undisputed that Lowe had been driving at the time of the accident and had admitted to an investigating officer that he had been drinking prior to the accident, and that the admission of the hospital records (which were appended to the Statement of Arresting Officer) was mandatory under §29A-5-2(b); (2) that while no one testified as to seeing Lowe drive improperly, he had subsequently admitted to the investigating officer that he had consumed alcohol and was driving at the time of the accident, and indicated that he was passing another car when the wreck occurred; and (3) that while the DMV gave some consideration to Lowe's criminal acquittal, this evidence did not outweigh the other evidence presented during the administrative hearing.

Reversed and Remanded.

State v. Woodson, No. 33701 – November 6, 2008 – Per Curiam (*Kanawha County – Bloom, J.*)

404(b) EVIDENCE – HEARSAY EVIDENCE – EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Appellant was convicted of first degree robbery and malicious wounding in connection with the beating of Timothy Barkey. The state alleged that the appellant and a co-defendant beat and robbed Barkey in the parking lot of a convenience store in Charleston. The appellant was sentenced to thirty-five years imprisonment on the robbery charge and two-to-ten years on the malicious wounding charge. On appeal, the appellant assigned a number of alleged errors, including (1) the admission of several instances of 404(b) evidence; (2) improper allegations of a racially-biased motive in the attack; (3) admission of hearsay statements in violation of the Confrontation Clause; (4)

the state's failure to disclose an exculpatory witness; (5) that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions; (6) disproportionate sentencing; and (7) ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

Held: The Court reviewed each claim and affirmed the appellant's convictions.

The Court determined (1) that admission of each of the four examples of alleged improper 404(b) evidence, which were not objected to at trial, did not constitute plain error warranting reversal; (2) that the co-defendant's statement to the victim that "you're in the 'hood now" before the robbery did not constitute an improper interjection of race into the trial; (3) that a statement made by the co-defendant (who did not testify in the trial) to the victim, which was not objected to at trial, did not constitute hearsay because it did not go to the truth of the matter asserted; (4) that there was no evidence that either the police or the prosecutor knew of the existence of a potentially exculpatory witness, and therefore could not be held liable for failing to disclose the witness' potential testimony; (5) that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support both the robbery and malicious wounding convictions; (6) that the appellant's sentences were within statutory limits and were not based on any improper factors; and (7) that the record was insufficient to address the appellant's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, including trial counsel's failure to object to various issues and to fully investigate the case

Affirmed.

Hatfield v. Painter, Warden, No. 33668 – November 12, 2008 – Per Curiam (*Wayne County – Hoke, J.*)

HABEAS CORPUS – APPEAL – COMPETENCY TO ENTER A PLEA

Appellee Hatfield pleaded guilty in 1998 to first degree murder and two counts of malicious wounding against the advice of his trial attorneys. His initial appeal was accepted by the Court, which remanded the case for a determination as to whether the appellee fully understood the consequences of his plea against the advice of counsel (*State v. Hatfield*, 186 W. Va. 507, 413 S.E. 2d 162 (1991) (*Hatfield I*). On remand, the circuit court determined that the appellee was competent at the time of his plea and denied his request to withdraw this guilty plea. The appellee appealed this determination, which was affirmed by the Court in *State v. Hatfield*, 206 W. Va. 125, 522 S.E. 2d 416 (1999) (*Hatfield II*).

The appellee filed a petition for *habeas corpus* relief, asserting, *inter alia*, that he was incompetent at the time that he entered his guilty plea. In an order dated January 31, 2005, the circuit court granted the appellee's motion for summary judgment, set aside the appellee's convictions, and ordered additional psychological testing. In a subsequent order (dated September 14, 2005), the court noted that the appellee was competent to stand trial and assist his counsel.

The State sought clarification of the order and noted that the circuit court had failed to make its own specific findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the appellee's *habeas corpus* relief and had merely referenced findings submitted by the appellee. In an order dated March 16, 2007 the court filed a supplemental order restating its' conclusions of January 31, 2005 and reciting the findings and conclusions referenced in the earlier order. The State appealed this order, arguing that the court's conclusions as to the appellee's competency were erroneous.

Held: The Court first addressed the procedural issue of the timeliness of the State's appeal. The appellee asserted that the State's appeal was untimely, filed over four months past the entry of the January 2005 order. The Court agreed with the State that the March 16, 2007 order was the proper appealable order because the 2005 order did not contain proper findings and conclusions as to the resolution of the *habeas* issues.

As to the merits of the appellant's appeal, the Court determined that the circuit court's grant of *habeas corpus* relief was erroneous. The Court noted that a review of *Hatfield I* and *Hatfield II* clearly indicated that the issue of the

appellee's competency at the time of his plea had been fully adjudicated by the time of the filing of the habeas petition, and thus the court had no authority to address the issue. This factor, compounded with the appellee's refusal to cooperate in further psychological testing following the initial remand, compelled the Court to reverse the circuit court's decision and remand the matter for consideration of other habeas grounds.

Reversed and Remanded.

State v. Cowley, No. 33804 – November 14, 2008 – Per Curiam (*Boone County – Schlagel, J.*)

ATTORNEYS – CONFLICT OF INTEREST – MISTRIAL – 404(B) EVIDENCE

Appellant was charged with burglary and second-degree sexual assault in connection with a March 22, 2003 attack on the victim, who testified that the appellant had forced his way into her home and sexually assaulted her. During trial, the appellant's trial counsel moved for a mistrial on the grounds that he had previously represented the victim in an unrelated juvenile matter two years before being appointed to represent the appellant. Counsel argued that such dual representation was a potential violation of Rule 1.9(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, upon the victim's provision of a written consent for counsel's continuing representation of the appellant, counsel withdrew the motion for mistrial. The appellant also stated on record that he did not object to the dual representation.

Following his conviction on the sexual assault charge, the appellant was sentenced to ten to twenty-five years imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant asserted that the trial court had committed reversible error by denying counsel's motion for a mistrial. The appellant also alleged that the trial court had erroneously denied his motion to strike a juror for cause, and had further permitted the introduction of improper 404(b) evidence.

Held: The Court addressed the dual representation issue, noting (1) the victim's written consent; (2) counsel's withdrawal of the motion after obtaining the consent; (3) the appellant's own agreement to the representation; and (4) the lack of evidence that the dual representation in any way impacted counsel's representation of the appellant. Finding that no manifest necessity existed for a mistrial, the Court denied the appellant's claim.

The Court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for move a prospective juror for cause, and that the appellant had failed to object to the seating of two other jurors on the panel.

The Court also determined that evidence of a second alleged attack by the appellant on another victim was properly admitted under Rule 404(b) to show a common scheme or *modus operandi*. The Court noted that the State had provided adequate pre-trial notice of their intent to use the evidence; that a hearing as to the evidence was conducted by the trial court; and that the jury was instructed on two occasions as to the proper use of the evidence.

Affirmed.

State v. Shingleton, No. 33650 – November 19, 2008 – Per Curiam (*Kanawha County – King, J.*)

SELF-DEFENSE – SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR INSTRUCTION

Appellant was indicted for robbery and malicious assault in connection with the 2004 beating of a Charleston man. The evidence indicated that the appellant had met the victim at a Charleston restaurant on the night of August 31, 2004 and had traveled with the man to various bars. After drinking rather heavily, the two men eventually went to the victim's apartment where the victim purportedly put his hand on the appellant's leg. After he removed his hand, the appellant severely beat the man, removed the man's wallet and left the apartment.

The appellant did not testify or offer any witnesses at trial. Based on the victim's testimony that he had put his hand on the appellant's leg, the appellant argued that he was fearful of sexual assault and requested a self-defense instruction. The court denied the request, noting that there was no evidence that the appellant was receiving or was about to receive a violent assault or sexual assault when he struck the victim. The appellant was convicted of malicious wounding. On appeal, he asserted that the circuit court's refusal to instruct the jury as to self-defense amounted to a denial of due process.

Held: The Court affirmed the appellant's conviction. The Court agreed with the circuit court that the evidence in the case did not justify a self defense instruction, given the lack of any evidence that the appellant was in imminent danger of a sexual or violent attack. The Court also noted the severity of the beating, and that the appellant had apparently continued beating the victim after knocking him unconscious with the initial blow.

Affirmed.

Damron v. Haines, No. 33900 – November 26, 2008 – Per Curiam (*Cabell County – O'Hanlon, J.*)

DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATION - *MIRANDA* STANDARDS – RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION

Appellant was convicted in 2005 for one count of first-degree arson and one count of second-degree arson in connection with two fires at a building which contained a small business and several apartments. The appellant was sentenced to thirty year imprisonment for these offenses. After his direct appeal was denied, the appellant filed a petition for post-conviction habeas corpus relief. The circuit court denied his petition following an omnibus hearing.

On appeal, the appellant alleged (1) that the trial court had erred by admitting an inculpatory statement made by the appellant at the scene of the fire to a deputy fire marshal; (2) that the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence a police report containing statements made by a non-testifying witness; and (3) that his convictions for both first and second degree arson violated double jeopardy.

Held: The Court held that the appellant's statement to the deputy fire marshal was not obtained in violation of *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court noted that the appellant's inculpatory response to a question from the arresting officer as to his reason for being present at the scene of the fire did not amount to a custodial interrogation. The Court noted that under the totality of the circumstances the appellant's response to the inquiry was more similar to an "on-the-scene" investigation and inquiry rather than a custodial interrogation.

The Court also determined that the appellant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was not violated by the admission of the police report, which contained a description of the arson suspect made by a non-testifying witness. The Court held that the evidence was offered only to show why the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the appellant. The Court further stated that even if the admission was error it was harmless error because the appellant had been acquitted of the charges addressed in connection with the initial arson.

The Court determined, however, that the appellant's convictions for both first and second degree arson violated double jeopardy. Applying the tests of *Blockburger v. United States*, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) and *State v. Gill*, 187 W. Va. 136 (1992), the Court held that all of the elements necessary to commit the offense of second degree arson were contained within the elements of first degree arson. As such, the Court held that the evidence presented at trial supported only a conviction for first degree arson, and ordered the vacation of the appellant's conviction for second degree arson.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

SENTENCING - ENHANCEMENT FOR PRIOR DRUG OFFENSES

Rutherford was arrested in 2005 and subsequently indicted for a single count of delivery of crack cocaine. At his sentencing hearing after his conviction, the state asked the trial court to double the appellant's one-to-fifteen year sentence under W. Va. Code §60A-4-408 (1971) because of a prior felony drug conviction. The appellant argued that the fact of the appellant's prior conviction should be determined by a jury. The court, relying on information in the appellant's file, sentenced the appellant to no less than two nor more than thirty years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant asserted that § 60A-4-408 denied the appellant his due process rights under the West Virginia Constitution. The appellant argued that the statute did not require that a defendant receive advance notice of the possibility of enhancement; did not require that the prior offense be set forth in the indictment; and did not set forth the evidentiary standard to be used in determining the validity of the prior offense. The appellant also argued that the standards utilized in recidivist cases under W. Va. Code § 61-11-18 (2000) be applied in cases under §60A-4-408, and also compared the provisions of §60A-4-408 to the due process protections afforded under §60A-4-406 (addressing drug delivery to minors or within 1000 feet of educational institutions).

Held: The Court first noted that the appellant was not contesting the validity of §60A-4-408 on federal due process grounds, because the use of prior convictions to enhance a sentence without further due process protection had been expressly approved in *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

The Court determined that §60A-4-408 did not violate the due process protections of Article III, Section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution. The Court held that the appellant was not convicted of an offense of which a prior conviction was an element, and therefore no advance notice of the use of the statute was required. The Court also declined the appellant's argument to extend the protections afforded under the recidivist statute to §60A-4-408, citing the distinctions drawn between the statutes in *State ex rel. Daye v. McBride*, 222 W. Va. 17, 658 S.E. 2d 547 (2007). The Court also held that the protections afforded under §60A-4-406 were irrelevant to the appellant argument, because "that statute requires findings of additional facts beyond the simple fact of a prior conviction."

Affirmed.

MUNICIPAL COURTS – VIOLATIONS OF ORDINANCES AS CRIMINAL OFFENSES

Appellants Hawkins and Mezzanotte were each issued a substantial number of parking tickets (377 and 94, respectively) in the City of Fairmont over the course of one year. Each entered into "amnesty" agreements with the City to pay fines and penalties for the tickets. After the appellants became delinquent in payment, they were summoned to appear before the city court to answer on the parking charges. Neither appeared and the City judge issued bench warrants for their arrests.

After posting bond on the charges, the appellants filed for injunctive relief and a writ of prohibition in the circuit court to prohibit the city court from conducting further proceedings regarding the tickets. The appellants argued that the municipal court did not have jurisdiction over the unpaid parking violations because the West Virginia Code did not define parking violations as criminal offenses, and that according to the municipal code, fines and penalties were to be collected through civil actions, including towing and immobilization of vehicles.

Held: The Court disagreed, citing long-existing precedent that violations of city ordinances are strictly criminal in nature and are not merely civil wrongs. The Court also recognized that municipal courts have the power to issue

arrest warrants for failing to appear in response to a summons. The Court further noted that the authority of municipal courts to issue warrants is the same as a magistrates, and that magistrates clearly have the authority to issue warrants for nonappearance for municipal proceedings.

Affirmed.

State v. Noll, No. 33903 – December 3, 2008 – Per Curiam (*Berkeley County – Sanders, J.*)

INDICTMENTS – VARIANCE WITH EVIDENCE AT TRIAL AND SENTENCE

The appellant was convicted of multiple burglary and larceny offenses and sentenced to three-to-thirty-five years imprisonment. On appeal, he asserted (1) that the state violated Rule 404(b) by improperly referring to a necklace worn by the appellant at this arrest as evidence from an unrelated burglary; (2) that the state had erred by questioning a witness regarding the appellant’s pretrial silence; and (3) that the sentence imposed on one of the counts did not correspond to the language of the indictment.

Held: The Court dealt summarily with the first two claims, noting (1) that the appellant’s counsel had not objected to the purported 404(b) evidence and had not included the alleged error in the notice of intent to appeal; and (2) that counsel had initiated the line of questioning regarding the appellant’s pretrial silence, had not objected to the testimony and had not included the error in the notice of intent to appeal.

As to the third issue, the Court noted that the particular count in the indictment specified that the appellant was charged with entering *without* breaking a dwelling house during the daytime, which the Court noted is punishable by a sentence of one-to-ten years. However, the trial court had imposed a one-to-fifteen-year sentence on this count, reflecting evidence introduced at trial which indicated a daytime burglary by breaking and entering.

The Court held that the introduction of the evidence and the trial court’s subsequent sentence amounted to a constructive amendment of the indictment. The Court reversed as to this particular count and remanded back to the trial court to permit molding of the verdict to reflect a conviction for entering without breaking and a reduction to the appropriate one-to-ten year sentence.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

State v. Messer, No. 33870 – December 10, 2008 – Per Curiam (*Mingo County – Thornsberry, J.*)

PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS – REASONABLE INFERENCES ARGUED AT CLOSING – EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS

The appellant shot and killed two men in a mobile home in Mingo County. The appellant gave a statement to the police that he shot the men while intervening in a violent fight between the two men and the homeowner. At trial, the State presented contrary evidence indicating that the appellant had burst from a bathroom and opened fire immediately after the men had entered the trailer. The State also presented evidence that the men were unarmed and had no wounds indicating that a violent altercation had occurred.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to two consecutive life terms. On appeal, the appellant presented a number of assignments of error including, *inter alia*, that the prosecuting attorney had misstated evidence in his closing argument and that the prosecutor had failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.

Held: The Court determined that the prosecutor had not misstated evidence but had made arguments based on reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial. The Court also held that while the prosecutor had no duty to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, some exculpatory evidence (including a statement from the appellant asserting self-defense) had nonetheless been presented to the grand jury.

The Court reviewed the remaining assignments and found no error in the appellant's trial.

Affirmed.

HABEAS RELIEF GRANTED IN SEXUAL ASSAULT CASE

Congratulations to Appellate Division attorney Jack L. Hickok and Second Circuit Chief Defender David Zehnder for their fine work in the case of Stephen Bowers.

Bowers, convicted of several sexual offenses in 2003, was released from prison on December 29, 2008 after Judge John Madden granted Bower's petition for habeas corpus relief. Judge Madden granted the petition with prejudice.

Judge Madden cited numerous examples of prosecutorial misconduct by the former prosecuting attorney in the case, and also held that Bower's original defense attorney was ineffective during his trial. Judge Madden held that "there would have been a favorable outcome for [Bowers] had he received effective representation and the prosecuting attorney had not overreached in his questions or arguments."

Among the errors noted in the court's memorandum Order, the court specifically cited the prosecutor's reference to Bowers as a "pervert", his classification of the case as "live child pornography", and the prosecutor's repeated statements of his personal opinion of Bowers' guilt. The court noted that trial counsel had failed to object to any of these errors, had failed to obtain psychological testing and had not effectively cross-examined state witnesses.

Bower's direct appeal of his conviction was unanimously refused by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in September 2004.

Bowers had served over five years of an eleven-to-thirty-five year sentence at the time of his release.

UPCOMING EVENT

WEST VIRGINIA PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICES

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Friday, March 13, 2009 **Grand Pointe Conference Center**

1500 Grand Central Avenue, Vienna, West Virginia

\$75.00 *Non-refundable registration fee* for Private Bar Members

8:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.

5.2 General CLE Credits

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Mail registration and fee to: WV Public Defender Services, One Players Club Drive, Suite 301,
Charleston, West Virginia 25305, Attn: Erin Fink

Contact Info: Erin Fink or Russell Cook, (304) 558-3905 *(No monies will be taken on the day of the seminar)*

Grand Pointe Conference Center, Vienna, WV ~ Registration deadline is Monday March 9, 2009

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